An Accurate and Multi-faceted Reputation Scheme for Cloud Computing  by Wang, Miao et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  466 – 473 
1877-0509 © 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Conference Program Chairs
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.07.021 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
The 11th International Conference on Mobile Systems and Pervasive Computing
(MobiSPC-2014)
An Accurate and Multi-faceted Reputation Scheme for Cloud
Computing
Miao Wanga, GuiLing Wangb,∗, Jie Tianb, Hanwen Zhanga, YuJun Zhanga
aInstitute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P.R.China
bDepartment of Computer Science, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark 07102, USA
Abstract
With the rapid growth of cloud computing, the importance of a reputation system for cloud computing services has attracted
a lot of attention. Building an objective and reliable reputation scheme has been crucial to promote the development of cloud
computing. To address the challenges of reputation evaluation in cloud computing, including the diverse nature of cloud services
and intricacy of malicious ratings, an Accurate and Multi-faceted Reputation scheme for cloud computing (AMRep) is proposed.
As the reputation systems of cloud computing are exposed to new vulnerabilities, AMRep introduces a couple of malicious rating
detection approaches to improve the accuracy of reputation calculation. Additionally, we establish a multi-faceted reputation
evaluation method, which can help user assess and choose cloud services from different angles. Experiments reveal that our
AMRep scheme can effectively defend against malicious ratings, and accurately calculate the reputation values of cloud services.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
With the rapid growth of cloud computing1 business, an increasing number of cloud providers become available.
Customers are facing more choices than ever before. Inexperienced customers are overwhelmed by so many complex
features and technical indexes. Establishing an objective and reliable reputation scheme is important to promote
the healthy development of cloud computing business2,3. Recently, researchers have presented various reputation
schemes for cloud computing environment. However, two key limitations exist in the most of previous studies. First,
many previous reputation systems evaluate a cloud service only based on a single rating index and assign an unique
overall reputation value for all of its attributes4,5,6. However, cloud services are of diverse dimensions and complex
patterns. Reputation evaluation for cloud services should involve multiple rating indexes and be differentiated across
multiple attributes, e.g., security, reliability, and performance etc. In addition, existing reputation calculation models
can not be applied to multiple indexes situation effectively. The reason is that they process users’ evaluations for each
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index separately, and thus each index reputation value is calculated independently7,8,9. However, customer ratings on
multiple indexes of a cloud service are correlated and need to be examined together to detect a variety of attacks.
In order to deal with the challenges of cloud service evaluation, such as the diverse nature of cloud services and
intricacy of malicious ratings, an Accurate and Multi-faceted Reputation scheme for cloud computing (AMRep) is
proposed. AMRep employs multiple rating indexes. By processing all index ratings in an inter-dependant way,
AMRep builds an accurate index reputation calculation model, which can effectively identify malicious users and
improve the accuracy of the reputation calculation. AMRep also designs a multi-faceted reputation evaluation method,
which combines relevant index reputation values to deduce the attribute reputation values of a cloud service at various
granularity. Experiments show that our scheme can effectively reject malicious ratings, and accurately calculate the
reputation values of cloud services.
2. Related Works
Reputation schemes have been successfully applied in e-commerce10, peer-to-peer network11, and web services12
to assist customers in choosing service providers of corresponding fields. In the domain of cloud computing, however,
the diverse nature of cloud services and intricacy of malicious ratings pose new challenges.
The reputation evaluation of users is discussed in the references13,14. Hwang and Li propose an idea that adopts an
overlay network over multiple data centers to implement a reputation system for establishing trust between providers
and data owners13. Tian et al. propose an AHP based reputation evaluation strategy in cloud computing. All these
works focus on users’ reputation14.
Everett suggests that a third party is required to evaluate the credibility of cloud service providers15. Subsequently,
several frameworks of reputation evaluation for cloud service providers are proposed in the works16,17. However,
these frameworks lack reputation calculation models.
Prior works on reputation calculation models have been presented in the references4,5,6,7,8,9,18. Li and Du describe
an adaptive reputation calculation model, which incorporates rough set algorithm and induce ordered weighted average
operator to reputation data mining and knowledge discovery18. The limitation of this scheme is that it requires to
embed computing software in the customer side. In reputation calculation models presented in the references4,5,6, only
an overall reputation value is computed based entirely on user satisfaction rate instead of multi-criteria assessment.
The authors in the references7,8,9 introduce multiple indexes to evaluate a cloud service from different perspectives.
Those models individually calculate each index reputation value, assuming that ratings for each index are independent.
Hence, malicious ratings cannot be detected effectively.
3. AMRep Scheme
3.1. The basic framework
We envision a marketplace for various cloud services from different vendors, in which all the services are evaluated.
By employing our Accurate and Multi-faceted Reputation scheme (AMRep), the marketplace collects customers’
feedbacks, processes the evaluation data, enables reputation inquiry and provides recommendations to the end users
of the cloud services.
In terms of input, different from the prior literatures, multiple rating indexes are used to investigate cloud services
with fine granularity from various perspectives. For example, the security of a cloud service is investigated from the
access control, encryption algorithm, key management, and data security etc. This is because cloud computing ser-
vices are extraordinary complex and require a lot of indexes to evaluate their different properties. The more detailed
the rating indexes are, the more accurately the quality of the cloud service is reflected. Given the input, AMRep
designs an accurate index reputation calculation model, which deals with multiple index ratings of customers simul-
taneously to identify and filter malicious ratings, and hence improves the calculation accuracy of index reputation
values. Additionally, AMRep proposes a multi-granularity reputation method, which combines related index reputa-
tion values to assess a cloud service with coarse granularity and from a particular perspective as per customer various
requests. For example, index reputation values of access control, encryption algorithm, key management, and data
security etc. are weighted to infer the security reputation value of the cloud service.
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Below, we present the design of AMRep in details. We focus on the reputation evaluation of a single cloud service
j. For simplicity of description, the subscript j is omitted in the following. Suppose users need to rate on the overall
quality (denoted by OQ) and m indexes (denoted by Iq (1 ≤ q ≤ m)) of a cloud service. There are g rating users (the
rating user set is denoted by RU). We employ a g× (m+ 1) matrix to represent the ratings given by users. The overall
rating given by the user uk (1 ≤ k ≤ g) on OQ in the (t + 1)th evaluation cycle is denoted by rt+1k . The rating on Iq by uk
in the (t + 1)th evaluation cycle is denoted by rt+1kq . The rating matrix RM in the (t + 1)th evaluation round is illustrated
as follows:
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3.2. Accurate index reputation calculation model
Previous reputation calculation models process each index/overall quality separately. Each index/overall reputation
value comes only from the ratings in the corresponding column in the rating matrix. These models can’t detect
malicious collusive users who aim to manipulate multiple ratings in a same manner and irresponsible users who give
ratings recklessly. Different from existing models, AMRep first investigates the correlation among users’ ratings, and
then identifies collusive users and irresponsible users from that of the large pool based on the unexpected disconnection
of users’s rating behavior to removing these users. Last AMRep develops an algorithm to calculate the reputation value
of a cloud service based on remaining users’ ratings.
3.2.1. Identify suspicious users
We first identify suspicious users whose ratings deviate from others significantly.
For ∀uk ∈ RU, if √√ ∑
ui∈RU,ik
(rt+1kq − rt+1iq )
2
h − 1 > ζ, (1)
uk’s rating on Iq is suspicious, where ζ (0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1) denotes the threshold of suspicious user detection. All suspicious
users of Iq constitute the suspicious user set of Iq, denoted by S Uq.
A user who belongs to Psr% (0 < Psr < 100) or greater of suspicious user sets in terms of indexes/overall quality is
called a suspicious user of the cloud service, where Psr% is called the suspicious rating item percentage. All of such
users are denoted by S U.
3.2.2. Identify collusive users
In S U, we identify collusive users through evaluation similarity clustering. Those who are employed by cloud
providers to overstate indexes of employers or understate those of competitors are referred to as collusive users.
The collusion detection process is as follows:
1. Calculate the evaluation similarity of each pair of users: for any two users in S U, calculate their similarity in the
current evaluation cycle. For ∀ue, u f ∈ S U, the evaluation similarity of them in the (t + 1)th evaluation cycle is
defined as
simt+1e f = 1 −
√√√(
rt+1e − r
t+1
f
)2
+
m∑
p=1
(
rt+1ep − r
t+1
f p
)2
m + 1
. (2)
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2. Construct the maximum spanning tree of fuzzy graph: first construct fuzzy graph G = (V, E) from elements in
S U, where V denotes the set of vertices and E denotes the set of undirected edges19. The weight of an edge is
the evaluation similarity of the two connected vertices calculated by Equation (2). We then construct maximum
spanning tree of graph G19.
3. Cut the edges of the maximum spanning tree to perform clustering: cut the edges with the weight below γ
(0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) in the maximum spanning tree (γ is called the threshold of collusive user detection). Each resultant
connected branch constitutes a cluster, vertices in which are possible collusive users - denoted by CU.
3.2.3. Identify irresponsible users
If a user consistently is an outlier when rating on different indexes, we determine the user is an irresponsible user
that gives random ratings and should not be included in the reputation calculation of indexes.
Removing collusive users CU from index q’s suspicious user set S Uq, we get irresponsible user set of Iq: IUq =
S Uq − CU. We employ an irresponsible rating item percentage Pir% (0 < Pir < 100). If uk ∈ RU belongs to the
irresponsible user set of more than Pir% rating items (indexes/overall quality), we determine that uk is an irresponsible
user of the cloud service. The irresponsible user set is denoted by IU.
3.2.4. Calculate reputation values
Removing both collusive users and irresponsible users from the rating user set, we obtain a filtered user set FU =
RU − CU − IU. The calculation of the reputation value of an index/overall quality is based on both the ratings given
by users in FU and the credibility of these users.
The credibility of uk, denoted by crt+1k , is defined by the following formula:
crt+1k = sim
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k + δ
t+1
k ,
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t+1
OQ
)2
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2 × (1 −
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η
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−
simt+1k
2 × (1 − η1−simt+1k ), else
, (3)
where simt+1k is the similarity of user k, comparing with the overall preference of the population; r¯
t+1
OQ and r¯t+1Ip indicate
the average rating on OQ and Ip by all users in FU respectively; δt+1k is the incentive factor and η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) denotes
the maximum tolerable rating deviation. When the evaluation given by uk lies within an acceptance range determined
by the average evaluation of all users and the maximum tolerable rating deviation, uk is trustworthy, and crt+1k is gained
by a small margin; on the contrary, uk is considered unlikely credible, crt+1k is greatly declined.
The reputation value for index Iq in cycle t + 1, denoted by IRt+1q , is calculated as the weighted average of ratings
on Iq given by users in FU.
IRt+1q =
∑
uk∈FU
crt+1k × r
t+1
kq∑
uk∈FU
crt+1k
. (4)
Similarly, the overall reputation value of the cloud service in cycle t + 1, denoted by Rt+1, is calculated as the weighted
average of ratings on OQ given by users in FU.
Rt+1 =
∑
uk∈FU
crt+1k × r
t+1
k∑
uk∈FU
crt+1k
. (5)
After t + 1 evaluation cycles, the cumulative reputation value for Iq, denoted by CIRt+1q , is calculated as the weight-
ed average of past cumulative reputation value CIRtq and the reputation value of t + 1 evaluation cycle.
CIRt+1
q
= (1−λ) ×CIRt
q
+λ × IRt+1
q
. (6)
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where the reputation learning factor λ (0 < λ ≤ 1) is the weight given to the most current reputation value. A greater
λ gives more recent ratings higher weight. Also, CRt+1, the cumulative overall reputation value of the cloud service
after t + 1 evaluation cycles, is given by
CRt+1 = (1−λ) ×CRt+λ × Rt+1. (7)
Note we set 0.5 for the the initial values of CIR0
q
and CR0.
We can observe that in human society, good reputation is built up gradually and slowly, but it can be destroyed
very fast if something bad happens. Therefore, we use a different λ when the newly calculated reputation value of the
current evaluation cycle is better than the previous one and when it is worse.
λ =
{
α, IRt+1
q
≥ CIRt
q
β, else , (8)
where α and β are the reputation increasing learning factor and reputation reducing learning factor respectively. 0 <
α < β ≤ 1.
3.3. Multi-faceted reputation evaluation method
To evaluate the attribute value, we first need to figure out the related indexes. For example, security is characterized
by the indexes of access control, encryption algorithm, key management, and data security etc. Then the weight of
each index is obtained using group Delphi method, AHP or dynamic fuzzy cognitive maps etc20. The attribute
reputation value is the weighted average of its all relative reputation values of indexes.
For a particular attribute Al (1 ≤ l ≤ n), its reputation value can be calculated as the weighted average of the
reputation values of the relevant indexes
(
Il1 Il2 · · · Ilz
)
. Suppose the corresponding weight vector is denoted by
Wl =
(
wl1 wl2 · · · wlz
)
. ARt+1l , the reputation value of attribute Al in the t + 1 evaluation cycle, is given by
ARt+1l =
z∑
i=1
IRt+1li × wli
z∑
k=1
wlk
. (9)
CARt+1jl , the cumulative reputation value of attribute Al after t + 1 evaluation cycles, is calculated as
CARt+1l =
z∑
i=1
CIRt+1li × wli
z∑
k=1
wlk
. (10)
4. Evaluations
In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness of our reputation scheme by using simulation. Our simulated cloud
service vender has 50 indexes. Qi (1 ≤ i ≤ 50), the true quality of index i, is modeled as a random number between
0 and 1. Customers rate on these indexes of the cloud service on a 0-1 scale. Three categories of customers are
simulated: 1) creditable users give honest ratings, i.e., they rate the cloud service from index i as Qi; 2) collusive
users give honest ratings on Psr% indexes and give complementary ratings on the remaining indexes, which is 1 − Qi
for index i; 3) irresponsible users give honest ratings on Pir% indexes and give random ratings on other indexes.
Collusive and irresponsible users together are referred to as malicious users. The simulation parameters and their
values of AMRep are listed in Table 1.
One of the most common reputation schemes, weighted majority algorithm (WMA), is implemented and served as
a benchmark21,22,23. WMA assigns weights to advisors, makes a prediction based on the weighted sum of the ratings
provided by them, and furthermore tunes the weights dynamically according interactions.
The simulation works on a continuous basis. In each simulation cycle, 10 customers rate on the 50 indexes of the
cloud service. Using these users’ ratings, new reputation values of the cloud service are calculated by AMRep and
WMA respectively. Then the simulation shifts to the next cycle.
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Table 1. Parameters and their values of AMRep.
Parameter Description(t) Values(t)
ζ suspicious user detection threshold 0.55
Psr% suspicious rating item percentage 30%
γ collusive user detection threshold 0.85
Pir% irresponsible rating item percentage 50%
η maximum tolerable rating deviation 0.9
α reputation increasing learning factor 0.2
β reputation reducing learning factor 0.6
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Fig. 1. False positive rate and false negative rate.
4.1. Effectiveness of malicious user detection
This section demonstrates AMRep’s ability to detect malicious users. We define two evaluation metrics: false
positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR). Let GS, CS and IS be the set of creditable, collusive and irrespon-
sible users respectively. Let DGS, DCS and DIS be the set of detected creditable, collusive and irresponsible users
respectively. FPR, the percentage of creditable users who are wrongly categorized as malicious users, is defined as
FPR =
‖GS ∩ (DCS ∪ DIS )‖
‖GS ‖
. (11)
FNR, the percentage of malicious users who are not detected and are categorized as creditable users, is defined as
FNR =
‖(CS ∪ IS ) ∩ DGS ‖
‖CS ∪ IS ‖
. (12)
We simulate 1000 users with 700 creditable users and 300 malicious users. To evaluate our scheme’s capability of
detecting malicious users, the collusive user ratio varies from 0% to 100%. For example, if the collusive user ratio is
50%, that means half of the malicious users are irresponsible and give random ratings and half of the malicious users
are colluding.
Fig.1 shows the FPR and FNR of AMRep and WMA under different collusive user ratios. As shown in Fig.1,
FPR of AMRep keeps at a low state no matter how much the collusive node ratio increases. With the increasing
of collusive users and decreasing of irresponsible users in malicious users, FNR of AMRep slides gradually. Fig.1
indicates AMRep has a consistent excellent ability to identify malicious users in various circumstances. In addition,
the figure demonstrates AMRep beats WMA. This is because AMRep takes into account all index ratings of users
simultaneously to accurately identify and filter unreliable ratings.
4.2. Reputation calculation and rating difference
This section examines reputation calculation of AMRep. Without loss of generality, we focus on index 1 and index
2. The quality of index 1 and index 2 is set to 0.85 and 0.15 respectively. 1000 users with 700 creditable users and 300
malicious users are simulated. In the experiments, the malicious users are composed by 50% collusive users and 50%
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Fig. 2. Computed reputation values and rating differences of index 1 and index2.
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Fig. 3. Response to service quality change.
irresponsible users. We introduce one new evaluation metric: rating difference. Rating difference for index i (RDi) is
the difference between the reputation value and real quality for index i, which is defined as
RDi =
∣∣∣CIRi − Qi∣∣∣ . (13)
Fig.2 shows the reputation values and rating difference of index 1 and index 2 calculated by AMRep and WMA.
In Fig.2, the reputation value of index 1 calculated by AMRep reaches 0.79 while WMA reaches 0.74 after 25 cycles.
Meanwhile, the reputation value of index 2 calculated by AMRep reaches 0.16 while WMA reaches 0.19. In conclu-
sion, The index reputation values calculated by AMRep are approaching to the real quality values more accurately
than WMA. Further the simulations show that RD1 and RD2 decrease over time, and the RD1 and RD2 of AMRep are
smaller than those of WMA. This indicates that our approach can more effectively purge the negative interference of
malicious evaluations, and hence more accurately calculate the index reputation values.
4.3. Response to service quality change
This section inspects AMRep’s response to the change of service quality. We simulate a community with all
creditable users and a cloud service provider whose service oscillates between high quality (0.95) and low quality
(0.05). Specifically, the service quality is 0.95 for five cycles, and then drops to 0.05 for five cycles and the pattern
repeats. We aim to assess how fast that AMRep can catch up with the service quality change.
Fig.3 shows the calculated reputation value by AMRep and WMA, compared to the true service quality. We can see
from the figure, that AMRep exhibits a more sensitive reaction to the change than WMA and thus can better reflect
the true service quality when the service quality changes, thanks to the adaptive reputation learning factor. When
inspecting the adaptation to the increase of service quality and the decrease of service quality, the reputation of the
high quality service node declines rapidly to a extremely low value due to providing low quality service during some
cycles. On the contrary its reputation cannot return to the original high value by providing high quality service during
the following several cycles. A slow reaction to the upward quality change may exclude those service providers who
frequently change their quality and encourage consistently reliable service providers.
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5. Conclusion
To cope with the diverse nature of cloud services and intricacy of malicious ratings, AMRep scheme is proposed.
The main contribution of this paper lies in: 1) present an accurate index reputation calculation model, which deals
with customers’ ratings simultaneously and introduces a variety of methods to resist malicious ratings for accuracy
improvement in the reputation calculation; 2) propose a multi-faceted reputation evaluation method, which evaluates
cloud service reputation from several angles with multiple attributes. Simulation results show that AMRep can effec-
tively detect malicious rating users, accurately calculate the reputation value of cloud services, and reasonably and
sensitively response to the change of service quality.
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